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Abstract 
 
Uber used a disruptive business model driven by digital technology to trigger a ride-sharing 
revolution.  The institutional sources of the company’s platform ecosystem architecture were 
analyzed to explain this revolutionary change.  
 
Both an empirical analysis of a co-existing development trajectory with taxis and institutional 
enablers that helped to create Uber’s platform ecosystem were analyzed. 
 
The analysis identified a correspondence with the “two-faced” nature of ICT that nurtures un-
captured GDP.  This two-faced nature of ICT can be attributed to a virtuous cycle of decline 
in prices and an increase in the number of trips.  
 
We show that this cycle can be attributed to a self-propagating function that plays a vital role 
in the spinoff from traditional co-evolution to new co-evolution. Furthermore, we use the 
three mega-trends of ICT advancement, paradigm change and a shift in people’s preferences 
to explain the secret of Uber’s system success. 
 
All these noteworthy elements seem essential to a well-functioning platform ecosystem 
architecture, not only in transportation but also for other business institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Ride-sharing revolution, ICT-driven disruptive business model, Uber’s system 
success, Two-faced nature of ICT, Un-captured GDP 
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1. Introduction 
The dramatic advancement of information and communication technology (ICT) in recent 
years has brought about a new reality in which information, people, organizations, logistics, 
and finance are constantly connected on a global level and mutually influence one another. 
This constant connection is starting to produce a hitherto non-existent synergy without being 
bound to the confines of existing industrial structure and technology fields.  Therefore, the 
synergy allows the creation of new businesses and markets, and is also starting to change how 
we work and live (Council of Science, Technology and Innovation, 2016) [9].   
Uber, an on-demand ridesharing service that connects passengers to local drivers in real 
time using smartphone technology, demonstrates this ICT-driven disruptive business model 
by triggering a ride-sharing revolution. 
In light of its conspicuous accomplishment, to date, considerable studies have been 
undertaken in elucidating, conceptualizing and operationalizing Uber’s system success. The 
studies can be classified into five streams: (i) prospect of automotive industry, (ii) ride-
sharing revolution, (iii) disruptive innovation, (iv) ICT-driven innovation, and (v) new 
business model. 
Schlze et al. (2015) [24] pointed out that automotive firms cope with turbulence caused 
by globalization, new government regulations, and advances in electronics, communication, 
and drive train technologies. In the mean time, these technologies are facilitating not only 
new product features but also new business models which Uber deployed as consumer 
preferences move toward mobility as a service rather than vehicles as products. They stressed 
the significance of a wide lens (Adner, 2012) [1] with change and stability. Avital et al. 
(2014) [2] stressed that an economy based on the exchange of capital, assets and services 
between individuals has grown significantly, spurred by the proliferation of Internet-based 
platforms that allow people to share underutilized resources and trade with reasonable 
transaction costs.  The movement to the ride-sharing revolution triggered by Uber was also 
postulated by Blk (2014) [5], Koopeman et al. (2014) [17], King (2015) [16] and Ehret 
(2015) [11]. Ehret referred Rifkin’s “Zero marginal cost society” (Rifkin, 2014) [23] and 
suggested un-captured GDP (Watanabe et al., 2016) [36] that Uber may emerge by stressing 
that “Soon we will have access to most products and services at almost no marginal cost. 
Mega-corporation will cease to make profits and the capitalist market economy will be 
replaced by a collaborative commons, where people exchange ideas and support each other 
with creative solutions.”  
This emerging paradigm is disruptive to the conventional company-driven economic 
paradigm as evidenced by a large number of peer-to-peer based services (Avital et al., 2014) 
[2] on which Uber is based. Isaac et al. (2014) [15] appreciated Uber as one of the most 
disruptive, successful tech start-up company which has severely disrupted the taxi service 
industry. They pointed out that much of the success Uber has generated so quickly relies on 
(i) its ability to classify itself as a “technology company” instead of a transportation company, 
(ii) the ability to classify their drivers as independent contractors instead of employees, and 
(iii) a depressed market in which workers are willing to assume the burden of risks and costs 
associated with driving for the company. They pointed that much of the reason why Uber has 
been so threating to the traditional taxi industry lay in its efficient and innovative utilization 
of modern technology, particularly ICT. Baiyere et al. (2015) [4] supported this view by 
stressing that rapid continuous advancement in ICT corresponds to the emergence of 
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disruptive ICT innovation increases. Horpedahl (2015) [14] highlighted smartphone apps are 
stressing that they allow consumers to bypass traditional taxicabs. All led to a new business 
model. Cohen et al. (2014) [7] reminded that some altogether new and different business has 
emerged over the several past years. These developments have started to challenge traditional 
thinking about how resources can and should be offered and consumed. This way of thinking 
supports the arguments that incremental improvements in our existing production and 
consumption systems are insufficient to transform our global economy toward sustainability 
(Lovins et al., 2011 [18], Stead et al., 2013 [26]). From these, a new business model 
inevitably emerges toward the shared economy. Cohen et al. (2014) [7] pointed out that 
shared mobility solutions can be attributed to multiple agents, including public and private 
providers, seek to develop business models which address deficiencies in public 
infrastructure and public transit systems, historically the exclusive purview of local and 
regional governments. They also warned that the common interest in sustainability among 
these different types of agents does not always lead to harmony, instead giving rise to agency 
conflicts that can reduce the positive sustainability impact of their individual and collective 
initiatives. Indeed, Uber has been confronting legal battles with the traditional automotive 
industry, particularly the taxi industry in some countries. 
All the preceding streams intertwine with each other leading to a new system design or 
systems web. Uber’s system success and ICT-driven disruptive business model, on which 
Uber is based, can be attributed to a co-evolution of this systems web. However, scholars 
have yet to undertake an analysis of a co-evolution of a systems web which connects these 
new streams.  
Inspired by noting the contrast between the world’s leading ICT countries with respect to 
happiness/welfare amidst great stagnation in Finland and conspicuous economic growth in 
Singapore, authors have demonstrated that current ICT-driven global development depends 
on a trend shifting from traditional co-evolution of computer-initiated ICT, captured GDP, 
and economic functionality to new co-evolution of the Internet, un-captured GDP, and supra-
functionality beyond economic value. The authors then demonstrated that the above contrast 
can be attributed to the difference between the two states in the shifting trends described 
above (Watanabe et al., 2016) [36]. 
This paper elucidates and conceptualizes Uber’s system success based on Uber’s 
contrasting disruptive innovation development trajectory and contrasts the ICT-driven 
disruptive business model with the traditional taxi industry based on a traditional business 
model. An empirical analysis similar to the analysis done on the co-evolution of three mega-
trends governing the difference of the state in the shifting trends was conducted. 
Section 2 reviews Uber’s conspicuous start-up.  Section 3 analyzes institutional enablers 
creating platform ecosystems. Section 4 demonstrates co-evolution of three mega-trends 
leading to sharing economy. Section 5 briefly summarizes noteworthy findings, implications, 
and suggestions for future works. 
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2. Uber, Its Conspicuous Start-up 
2.1 Digital Technology Driven Disruptive Business Model  
Ride-sharing company Uber is a high-tech company founded in March 2009 (Table 1). It 
is seen as the jewel of ICT as it brilliantly connects the transportation industry with ICT via 
its ride-sharing application and it leverages the sharing revolution (Belk, 2014) [5], leading to 
the transformation of the market for taxi cabs and limousines. It offers its service in over 375 
cities worldwide in 2015 (Figs. 1a, 1b). Uber is regarded as the highest-valued venture-
supported company. It is currently one of the fastest growing start-ups worldwide. It’s value 
exceeds the value of the full US taxi and limousine industry. 
Uber gives passengers a better service with cost and time savings in reaching a location, 
and it provides its drivers with a highly efficient operation without additional investment and 
license fees (Table 2). Its system is convenient also for drivers. They can work flexible hours 
and can reject unwanted clients. 
Through a cashless system based on credit cards, Uber can trace and choose highly-rated 
drivers. Reliance on digital technology provides passengers with a transparent view of quality 
and prices. Similarly, drivers can memorize passenger’s behavior. Thus, Uber has established 
a mutual rating system among the company, drivers, and passengers. 
In this way, Uber has triggered a disruptive business model which is driven by digital 
technology. This technology has been significantly impacting traditional business, not only in 
transportation but also almost all business institutions. 
Uber appraised  itself  for  this  business  model  as  “Uber  epitomizes
disruption. The company has changed the way we think about grabbing a
ride, incorporating the same technology we take for granted today into a 
brand new experience for consumers and an opportunity for producers” (A Brief History of 
Uber) [29]. 
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Table 1 Parallel Paths between History of Uber and ICT Advancement 
 
 
Year Uber’s Story Advancement of ICT 
2008 Winter The story of Uber in Paris Apple’s iPhone (2007), Google’s Android (HTC)  
2009 March UberCab (renamed to Uber in 2011) was 
established in SF 
Many new smartphone models and OS launched. 
2010 July UberCab (on-demand car service via an iPhone 
app or SMS (short message service)) released in 
SF. 
Apple iPad tablet, Instagram was founded. 
2011 May Expanded into a new city each month including 
NYC, Chicago and Washington DC 
3 Billion Android downloads,  
Tablet pc’s by Samsung, Sony, Acer, etc. 
 Dec In operation in Paris (first outside of the US) 
Raised 44.5 m US$ 
2012 July  UberX (low cost Uber: for-pay rideshare scheme, 
trips cost less than the same journey in an ordinary 
taxi) 
Android and iOS dominated the market share. 
US smartphone sales passed featured phone sales. 
2013 Summer Faced competition from  ride-sharing services like 
Lyft 
Experimental Uber Chopper (helicopters 
transporting service) 
85% of US adults use the Internet, 2 Million apps, 
U.S. consumer spends 126 minutes per day on  
Mobile apps compared to 168 minutes on TV 
2014 April Banned by the government in Berlin In person, Mobile payments in the US doubled to $3.7B 
59% of US smartphone owners do mobile shopping. 
Since 2010 the Digital media time spent on  
Smartphone increased by 394% and tablets by 1,721%  
Both platforms account for 60% of total time spent. 
 June Taxi drivers in London, Paris, and Madrid staged a 
large-scale protest 
 August UberPool (matching  passenger with another rider 
heading in the same direction) 
 October Received an “F” (flunk)  rating from the Better 
Business Bureau (BBB) 
November Uber Go (officially the cheapest ride in town) 
2015 Feb Established Uber Advanced Technology Center 
(collaboration with Carnegie Mellon) 
78% of US mobile subscribers owned a smart phone. 
US consumers spend 4.7 hours on average on smartphone 
each day. 
U.S. consumer now spends 198 minutes per day on  
Mobile apps compared to 168 minutes on TV 
U.S. has the highest average rate of monthly data 
consumption via smartphone: a colossal 20 GB. 
April UberEATS program (food delivery service) 
 May Uber Military Families Coalition, App 
accommodating for drivers for deaf or hard of 
hearing 
58 countries and 300 cities 
2015 Dec Market value 62.5 B US$ 
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Uber’s Worldwide Expansion Trajectory 
 
Fig. 1.1. Uber’s Expansion Trajectory Worldwide. 
              Source Uber.com. 
Uber’s Expansion in 375 cities Worldwide (as of Jan.2016) 
 
Fig. 1.2. Uber’s Expansion in 375 Cities on World Map (as of Jan. 2016). 
Source: Author’s geocoded map based on Uber’s cities list at Uber.com (see Appendix 5). 
 
 
 
Uber Expansion 2010-2014 
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Table 2 Competitive Analysis between Uber and Taxi 
 Uber Taxi Remarks (Uber’s unique advantage) 
Advance booking No Yes                             
 
Hiring method Smart phone App Flag/Call center/App/ 
Dedicated taxi queue 
 
Payment Cashless Cash/Credit card 
 
Driver/Passanger rating Available NA Co-evolution by mutual rating system 
Pricing structure Premium principle 
Flexible  
Surge pricing 
Cost principle 
Structured 
Customers pay for services for reliable, 
punctual, comfortable 
Clear overview of price before booking 
Respond to changes in supply and 
demand in the market 
Fare sharing Anyone Limited to friends 
 
ETA to destination Available NA Estimated Time of Arrival. Follow 
drivers on map 
ETA of  the ride Availabe Available (Apps only) One-tap ride  
Car Self Rented from taxi company 
 
Driver’s percpectives Flexible and 
independent 
Rigid Motivation why drivers choose Uber 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
91%: Earn more income, 87%:  
To be my own boss, 
85%: flexible and balancing with a 
better life. 
Law and regulation Gray area Well defined 
Value capture to company Commission fee Rental fee, Advertisement 
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2.2 Astounding Rise 
As a general consequence of the numerical analysis of newly emerged innovation, 
elucidation of Uber’s systems success was a challenge in exploring the dark continent without 
published statistical data. 
 
Fig. 2 attempts to trace the trajectory of Uber’s astounding rise. Conspicuousness of 
Uber’s disruptive business model can be confirmed by the astounding rise in the number of 
its users. Based on expense reports from business travelers, Certify (2015) [6] revealed that 
an average 46% of all total paid car rides were through Uber in major markets across the US 
in March 2015. This demonstrates a steep rise particular in business use over the 14 months 
from a mere 15% in January 2014 as demonstrated in Fig. 2. 
 
Uber’s fast rise to success directly correlates with the decrease in the number of 
traditional taxi users. The share of taxi, limousine and shuttles of that number fell 
dramatically from 85% to 54% over this 14 months.  This observation is rather biased 
towards Uber, as the report is focused on business travelers, it has been estimated that the 
number of people using Uber is higher than the number of people using a taxi now (Frier, 
2015) [12]. 
 
Fig. 2. The trend in Share of Rides by Taxi and Uber in the US (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
Sources - Jan. 2014 – Mar. 2015: Certify (2015) [6], other periods: authors’ estimate based on TLC and Uber 
(See Appendix 1). 
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Fig. 3-3.  Trend in Taxi Prices in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
 
Fig. 3-1.  Trend in Taxi Trips in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). Fig. 3-2.  Trend in Meter Revenues in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
2.3 Trend in the Substitution for Taxi 
   (1) Trends in Taxi Revenues, Trips and Prices (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015) 
Figs. 3-1 – 3-3 demonstrate trends in taxi revenues, trips and prices in NYC over the 
period June 2013 – September 2015. 
As a consequence of Uber’s astounding rise in a co-existing development trajectory with 
taxis, the number of trips in taxis demonstrates rapid decline (Fig. 3-1) which resulted in their 
revenues decline (Fig. 3-2) and subsequent increase in their prices (Fig. 3-3).  
 
Sources: TR and TT- Jun. 2013 – Mar. 2015: Hickman (2015) [13] based on NYC Taxi and Limousine 
Commission (TLC), another period: authors’ estimate based on TLC. PT = TR/TT (See Appendix 1). 
Trips per day per medallion 
5 months moving average. 5 months moving average. 
Meter revenues/trips 
TT 
TR 
PT 
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PU 
2014/5 14/8 14/10 14/11 2015/1 
Fig. 4. Trends in Uber and Taxi Trips in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
 
Sources – Taxi: Fig. 3-1. Uber: authors’ estimate based on                           ,  
                 
                  
Fig. 5.  Trends in Uber and Taxi Prices in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
 
Sources – Taxi: Fig. 3-3, Uber – Jun. 2013 - Nov. 2014: Lunden (2014) [20], other 
period:  Authors ‘estimate based on TLC, Uber, Stone (2015) [27] and 
Silverstein (2014) [25] See Appendix 1). 
(2) Comparison of the Trends in Trips and Prices between Uber and Taxi  
Fig. 4 demonstrates trends in Uber and taxi trips in NYC over the period June 2013 – 
September 2015. Similarly, Fig. 5 demonstrates trends in Uber and taxi prices in NYC over 
the same period.1 
At the same time as Uber’s astounding success, Uber’s prices continued to decline and in 
May 2014 they reached the same level as taxis. The prices further declined with the 
introduction of UberPool in August 2014. The decline in prices was reversed as a 
consequence of Uber’s surge pricing, and resulted in an “F” (flunk) rating from the Better 
Business Bureau (BBB) in October 2014 when complaints about unexpectedly high charges 
were cited. In response to such complaints and also to competition from competitors such as 
Lyft, Uber managed to decrease prices by introducing Uber Go in November 2014. This 
move, together with technology advancement effort by the establishment of the Uber 
Advanced Technology Center in February 2015, led to lower prices again in 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
D
D
T TU
UU ⋅
−
=
1
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This analysis focuses on the state in NYC as it demonstrates pioneer state of ridesharing revolution in the US 
(Hickman, 2015 [13]; Silverstein, 2014 [25]; Stone, 2015 [4]), and all data in Figs. 4 and 5 are based on the state 
in NYC, except Uber share (UD) in estimating Uber trip (UT) in Fig. 4. Due to unavailability of reliable statistics 
on UD in NYC, it based on the average Uber share in the US focusing on business use (Fig. 2) which should be 
interpreted slightly reserved to Uber trips in NYC. 
where UT: Uber trip, TT: Taxi trip, UD: Dependency on Uber 
(share of Uber trips out of sum of Uber and taxi trips as 
demonstrated in Fig. 2) (See Appendix 1). 
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3. Institutional Enablers Leveraging Uber’s Astounding Rise 
3.1 Sharing Economy for Physical Products 
 
Uber’s astounding rise can largely be attributed to dissemination of sharing economy 
from digital products to physical products. 
 
In line with people’s preferences shift from economic functionality to supra-functionality 
beyond economic value (Watanabe et al., 2014 [34]), sharing economy in physical products 
(i.e., rooms and cars) has been gaining momentum.  
 
The underlining paradigm of the original sharing economy is that users aim at increasing 
resource-use efficiency, to lower costs or to create new value. Online trading platforms such 
as Napster and eMula were amongst the first to provide users with shared access to digital 
music and videos. It was possible to download these digital products from lenders on the 
platform for free, and uploading and downloading happened simultaneously (Winterhalter et 
al., 2015 [35]). 
 
People’s preference shift to supra-functionality has led to requests for a similar platform 
also for physical products. People wish to use such products (which were provided passively, 
primarily with economic functionality) in a more sophisticated manner by their initiative 
(Adner, 2012 [1]). 
 
Sharing economy for physical products initiated by Uber and AirbnB is needed by the 
market with such underlining paradigm. 
 
3.2 Institutional Enabler of Sharing Economy in Physical Products 
 (1) Advancement of ICT 
The main enablers of the sharing economy are ICT and Internet connectivity, which allow 
effective peer-to-peer contact (The Economist, 2013 [28]). 
Thanks to the dramatic advancement of the Internet, countless websites connect people on 
a peer-to-peer basis with separate resources of almost any kind (not only time, digital 
information and knowledge resources but also space and fixed assets) to the needs of others 
searching for these resources. 
Such advancement, particularly of a smartphone, nurtures Uber by enabling high 
qualified services with lower cost 2  and shorter time. Fig. 6 demonstrates a trend in 
smartphone share in the US mobile subscriber market over the period July 2013 - September 
2015.  Looking at Fig. 6 we note that while smartphone has gained popularity, and its share in 
the mobile subscriber market demonstrated a sharp increase in the US, there has been 
stagnation in the upward surge and a shift from quantity to quality in 2015 in nationwide in 
the US (comScore, 2013-2015 [8]). 
                                                          
2
 e.g., from downtown L.A. to the airport (Uber: 22 US$, Taxi: 46.5 US$ (56 $ with 20% tip)) in 2015.  
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Fig. 6. The trend in Smartphone Share in the US Mobile Subscriber Market (Jul. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
Smartphone share of the US mobile subscriber market: % of mobile subscribers aged 13+ owning a smartphone.  
Source: comScore (2013-2015) [8]. 
 
(2) Passengers Initiative and Paradigm Shift to Ecosystem 
Passengers initiative also strengthens, while the company’s systematic market strategy 
brings benefits such as continuous reductions incosts and time for searchand matching 
while eliminatinginformation asymmetries and compiling a massive database. 
 
Uber compiles a massive database on driver and rider behavior, which is essential to Uber 
price-setting and market-making. Also, it allows Uber and the regulators to ensure safety and 
to root out discrimination against passengers. 
 
In addition to the introduction of the Internet, the paradigm shift from resources to 
ecosystem (from captured GDP to un-captured GDP (Watanabe et al., 2014, 2015 [34, 35]) 
has been leveraged by Uber in its creation of a new business. Shifting from traditional in-
house-oriented business towards services making use of interactions between the 
stakeholders: company, drivers, and passengers. 
 
Under the support of these institutional enablers, Uber was able to accomplish astounding 
rise by the following simple business model: 
(i) Its smartphone-based app connects drivers, offering rides and passengers seeking them, 
(ii) Passengers pay mileage-based fees through credit cards that company keeps on file, and 
(iii)  Uber takes a percentage of each fee and gives the rest to its driver. 
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3.3 Self-propagating Virtuous Cycle 
(1) Governing Factors of Uber Prices Decline 
Since Uber prices (PU) are governed by the increase in smartphones demonstrated by its 
share in the mobile subscriber market (SP), learning and economy of scale effects, their trend 
can be depicted as follows: 
TU
TU
USPAP
USPAP
lnlnlnln λα
λα
−+=
⋅⋅=
−
 
A: scale factor, UT : Uber trips,  :α SP elasticity to PU, and :λ  learning coefficients (learning 
and economy of scale effects) 
 
Based on this equation, Table 3 identifies governing factors of Uber prices in NYC over 
the period June 2013-September 2015 by dividing into three periods: 2013/6-2014/7 (sharp 
decline), 2014/8-2014/11 (change to increase due to surge pricing), and 2014/12-2015/9 (decline by 
introducing Uber Go and technology advancement effort) corresponding to Fig. 5 analysis. 
 
Table 3 Governing Factors of Uber Prices in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015) 
25.1980.0.ln376.0ln278.0ln213.0ln551.0ln015.1ln717.0361.6ln 2321321 DWRadjUDUDUDSPDSPDSPDP TTTU −+−−−−=
PU: Uber’s prices, SP: Smartphone subscriber market share (%), UT: Uber trips, and D1, D2, D3: Dummy variables. 
D1: 2013.6 – 2014.7 = 1, rest = 0. D2: 2014.8 – 2014.11 = 1, rest = 0, D3: 2014.12 – 2015.9 = 1, rest = 0. 
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: significant at *1 :1%, *2 :2%, *4 :10%, *5 : 15% level. 
 
       Table 3 demonstrates that while SP elasticity to PU maintains negative with smaller value 
in the 3rd period, learning co-efficient changed from negative to positive in the 2nd period and 
changed again to negative in the 3rd period. The former corresponds to the observation in Fig. 
6 while the latter corresponds to the observation in Fig. 5.  
Utilizing the results of Table 3, the contribution of Uber prices decrease can be identified 
as summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Contribution of Uber Prices Decrease in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015) - % p.a. 
PU decrease  
rate 
Contribution by Period 
SP increase rate UT increase rate Miscellaneous 
-3.07 -0.717 x 1.52  = -1.09 -0.213 x 11.92 = -2.54 0.56 2013/6   - 2014/7 
1.87 -1.015 x 0.62 = -0.63 0.278 x 13.02 = 3.62 -1.12 2014/8 - 2014/11 
-3.43 -0.551 x 0.51 = -0.28 -0.376 x 9.57 = -3.60 0.45 2014/12 - 2015/9 
      
 Looking at Table 4 we note that Uber’s prices have been governed by the increase in its 
trips and own strategy together with the increase in smartphones. Contribution of trips 
increase can be attributed to learning and economy of scale effects (Watanabe et al., 2009 
        (4.06*1)      (-1.80*4)        (-2.62*2)                (-1.49*5)             (-3.63*1)               (2.52*2)             (-10.84*1) 
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[32]) while contribution of smartphones increase can be attributed through ICT’s self-
propagating function that accelerates learning and economy of scale effects (Watanabe et al., 
2004 [30], Watanabe et al., 2009 [32]).  
 
As analyzed in Fig. 5, sharp decline in Uber prices stagnated from August 2004 and 
changed to upward trend by serious complaints about unexpectedly high charges due to surge 
pricing in October 2014. While this upward shifting factor remains, the price decline trend 
was maintained by introducing Uber Go in November 2014 together with technology 
advancement effort. This challenge in the 3rd period demonstrated high elasticity of trips to 
prices and compensated the stagnation of smartphones share increase in 2015. Upward trend 
in the 2nd period can be attributed to surge pricing strategy. 
 
Table 4 demonstrates these rise and fall trends. Noteworthy is a resilient recovery in price 
decline in the 3rd period despite stagnation of smartphones contribution to this decline. This 
suggests a sophisticated dynamism in Uber’s ICT-driven trips and prices coordination which 
is beyond simple ICT’s self-propagating function as well as learning and economy of scale 
effect. 
(2) Virtuous Cycle between Uber Trips Increase and Its Prices Decline  
Inspired by the foregoing suggestion, Fig. 7 analyzes the correlation between Uber’s trips 
and their prices in NYC over the same period. 
 
Fig. 7. Correlation between Uber’s Trips and Their Prices in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
 
Fig. 7 demonstrates three phases trends corresponding to the three periods in Table 4. 
While Uber’s prices demonstrated sharp decline as smartphones increased in the 1st period, 
after recovering from the upward trend in the 2nd period, prices decline was maintained under 
trips increase initiative despite smartphones direct effect decreased. This dynamism prompts 
us the sources of Uber’s success leading to its astounding rise as reviewed earlier. Given 
Uber as the jewel of ICT as reviewed in 2.1, this success is considered to depend on ICT’s 
unique comprehensive function beyond simple self-propagation, learning and economy of 
scale effects. 
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4. Co-evolution of 3 Mega-trends Leading to a Spinoff to Sharing Economy 
  4.1 Emergence of Un-captured GDP 
    (1) Medallion Prices as a Proxy of the Trend in Taxi Demand 
The medallion system (official taxi licenses with medallion, in place since 1937) sets an 
upper limit of the number of those cabs with licenses. As the demand grew, medallions 
became more and more valuable, resulting in higher medallions prices. Therefore, the trend in 
medallion prices can be considered as a proxy of a trend in taxi demand3 and given its 
sustainable increase, Taxi medallions were considered the best investment in the US (Badger, 
2014) [3]. 
Thus, this trend continuously increased, experiencing logistic growth as demonstrated in 
Table 5. This trend led to a sharp hike in medallion prices from 250 thousand US$ in January 
2004 to a peak of 1.3 million US$ (for the corporate sector) in June 2013, as demonstrated in 
Fig. 8. 
 
Table 5 Estimates of Medallion Prices for the Period preceding their Stagnation  
(Jan. 2004-Jun. 2013) 
               
 
                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
           Y: Medallion prices, N: Carrying capacity, t: Monthly trend, a, b: Coefficients 
              All t-values demonstrate statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
                                                          
3
 Medallion prices demonstrate significant correlation with taxi trips as follows and support this view: 
 
Correlation between Taxi Trips (TT) and the Medallion Prices (MP) in NYC (monthly basis)  
 
Jan. 2000 - May 2013 (Before MP stagnate due to Uber) 
52.1986.0.ln174.4573.9ln 2 DWRadjTMP T+−=  
(-18.55)    (30.56) 
 
Jun. 2013 - Sep. 2015 (After MP stagnate) 
04.1911.0.147.1ln595.2102.2ln 2 DWRadjDTMP T −+−=    
(-3.78)   (16.36)              (-3.87) 
 
D: Dummy variables (Jun. 2013 and Sep. 2015 = 1, other months = 0). 
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-value: all significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
Estimate t-value adj. R2 
N 2247.11 7.23 0.976 
a 0.02 14.21
 
b 6.36 7.21
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However, starting in May 2011, Uber added more and more drivers, the medallion prices 
started stagnating after a peak in June 2013. The prices then fell precipitously from May 2014, 
corresponding to the time when Uber prices reached the level of taxis prices as demonstrated 
in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 8. Trends in Corporate Medallion Prices and their Estimate without Uber in NYC  
            – 2013 prices (Jan. 2004 – Sep. 2015).  
Source: NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC). 
(2) Correlation between Dependency on Uber and Medallion Prices  
The more cabs are booked through Uber, the less money the cab drivers make and the 
worse the taxi medallions look like as an investment. Medallion prices have continued to 
drop considerably after Uber, with prices declining, caught up with the price level of a 
traditional taxi in May 2014. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Correlation between Dependency on Uber and Medallion Prices in NYC  
(Jun. 2013.6 – Sep. 2015). 
Sources: NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) and Certify [6]. 
Actual medallion prices 
Dec. 2013 
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Fig. 9 illustrates the correlation between dependency on Uber (share of Uber trips out of sum 
of Uber and taxi trips) and medallion prices (as a proxy of taxi demand) in NYC over the period June 
2013 – September 2015. 
Uber’s astounding success brought its prices lower than a taxi in May 2014 (Fig. 5). 
Uber's success resulted in a significant decrease in medallion prices (Fig. 8). Reduced 
madallion prices (taxi demand decrease) induce further dependency on Uber, leading to a 
virtuous cycle between medallion prices decline and increase in this dependency, as 
demonstrated in Fig. 10. 
 
)07.5()31.3()22.14()06.1()50.11()43.77( 7*
2
2131211 77.1948.0.131.0895.1ln420.0ln220.0ln554.0435.8ln
−−−−
−−−+−=
−−−
DWRadjDDUDDUDDUDDMP tttt
 
MP: Medallion prices, UD: Dependency on Uber, D1, D2, D3, D: Dummy variables. 
D1: 2013.6 – 2013.12 = 1, rest = 0. D2: 2014.1 – 2014.5 = 1, rest = 0. D3: 2014.6 – 2015.9 = 1, rest = 0. 
D: 2013.7-8, 2015.9 = 1, other months = 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
)62.3()88.11()06.3()11.13()22.15(
46.1980.0.770.92ln910.1ln030.11ln051.2022.17ln 2111 2321
−−−
−−+−=
−−−
DWRadjDMPDMPDMPDUD tttt
 
D1: 2013.6 – 2013.12 = 1, rest = 0. D2: 2014.1 – 2014.5 = 1, rest = 0. D3: 2014.6 – 2015.9 = 1, rest = 0. 
Fig. 10. Virtuous Cycle between Dependency on Uber and Medallion Prices  
(Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
 Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level except *7: 30% level. 
This demonstrates a structural source of the contrast between precipitous fall of the 
medallion prices and astounding rise of Uber. 
 
(3) Two-faced Nature of ICT and Subsequent Un-captured GDP 
The impacts of Uber’s sharing revolution on the medallion system in NYC can be 
classified into two periods: 
(i) During the first two years after the launch of Uber in May 2011, Uber’s share 
remained below 10% (Fig. 2), and its impact on medallion prices was limited. The 
medallion prices continued to increase, due primarily to the increase in demand for a 
taxi.  
(ii) However, after this “pregnancy period,” once Uber’s share reached 10% in June 
2013 overcoming the Chasm in a diffusion trajectory (Moore, 1999 [22]), 4  the 
                                                          
4
 Analysis based on the diffusion theory identifies this timing of Uber in NYC as early 2013 (See Appendix 2). 
Dependency on Uber           Medallion prices 
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sharing revolution made a structural change to the medallion price formation system, 
leading to the above-mentioned precipitous fall. 
Table 5 suggests that without such sharing revolution which made a structural change in 
the price formation system, the medallion prices may continue to logistic growth as illustrated 
in Fig. 8 by a broken line. Contrast of actual and estimated medallion prices corresponds to 
the two-faced nature of ICT which postulates that while the advancement of ICT contributes 
to enhancing its prices by increasing new functionality development, dramatic advancement 
of the Internet tends to decrease ICT prices due to freebies, easy copying, and mass 
standardization, among other things as illustrated in Fig. 11 (Cowen, 2011 [10]).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prices of technology at fixed prices are equibalent to marginal productivity of technology given 
the firm seeks to profit maximum condition under the competitive circumstances. 
 
Fig. 11. Two-faced Nature of ICT. 
 
This suggests the emergence of un-captured GDP as Uber advances. Advancement of ICT 
can largely be attributed to the dramatic advancement of the Internet, which has changed the 
computer-initiated ICT world significantly. The Internet promotes a free culture, 
consumption of which provides utility and happiness to people but cannot be captured 
through GDP data that measure revenue (Lowrey, 2011 [19]) leading to increasing 
dependency on un-captured GDP (Watanabe et al., 2014, 2015 [34, 35]).  
 
Uber’s better service with cost and time savings for passengers by highly efficient 
operation without additional investment and license fees for drivers correspond to this 
concept. Therefore, discrepancy between actual medallion prices and estimated medallion 
prices without Uber in Fig. 8  can be considered as demonstrating the magnitude of un-
captured GDP (See Appendix 2). 
 
 
 
 
PI 
Un-captured GDP 
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(4) Magnitude of the Emergence of Un-captured GDP 
Inspired by the preceding observation with respect to emergence of un-captured GDP 
driven by the discrepancy induced by Uber, un-captured GDP emerged by Uber can be 
captured by measuring the discrepancy between taxi prices and magnitude of their decline 
effect derived from Uber as illustrated in Fig. 12: 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Scheme of the Measurement of the Emergence of Un-captured GDP Emerged 
by Uber in NYC. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 demonstrates the significant parallel correlation between taxi prices (PT) and 
estimated medallion prices without Uber (Mpe), as well as aggregated prices (PA) and actual 
medallion prices (MP) (See Appendix 3). This endorses the view that the balance between 
taxi prices and aggregated prices represents the emergence of un-captured GDP emerged by 
Uber.  
 
 
 
  
where PT:  Taxi prices, PU: Uber prices, PA: Aggregated prices, 
          TT: Taxi trip, UT:  Uber trip, α: UT/TT ratio. 
)(
1
1
1 1 UT
UT
T
TT
UTTT
TAT PP
PPP
UT
PUPTPPP −
+
=
+
⋅+
−=
+
⋅+⋅
−=−=
αα
α
Un-captured GDP 
Since magnitude of taxi prices decline 
effect can be measured by the aggregated 
prices of taxi and Uber with respective 
trip share,  un-captured GDP emerged by 
Uber can be measured by the following 
balance: 
2013/12 
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4.2 Emergence of Uber-Driven Un-captured GDP 
    (1) Substance of the Uber-driven Un-captured GDP 
 
Supported by the preceding endorsement, Fig. 13 demonstrates the magnitude of un- 
cacaptured GDP per trip emerged by Uber.  
 
Fig. 13. Trends in Taxi Prices and Aggregated Prices in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
Aggregated prices PA are measured by the following equation: 
TT
TUTT
A UT
UPTPP
+
⋅+⋅
=  
 
The substance of this un-captured GDP can be summed up as follows: 
High-qualified services with lower cost and shorter time. An increasing initiative of 
passengers and the company’s systematic market strategy of continuous reduction of costs 
and time in search and matching, eliminating information asymmetries and compiling a 
massive database.  
Fig. 13 demonstrates that while Uber nurtured “negative un-captured GDP value” (its 
services were unable to catch up with those of taxi accumulated over the last 120 years) by 
June 2014, it succeeded in nurturing increasing un-captured GDP from the beginning of 2015 
corresponding to its success in sustainable decline in prices from the end of 2014 (Fig. 5). 
(2) Increase in the Emergence of Un-captured GDP 
On the basis of the preceding review, the trend in the value of un-captured GDP per trip 
by Uber in NYC was measured as illustrated in Fig. 14. This Figure demonstrates that un-
captured GDP induced by Uber has been increasing significantly from the beginning of 2015. 
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As emulating in the following equation, this can be attributed to a virtuous cycle between 
Uber’s prices (PU) decline and trips (UT) increase.  
 
Un-captured GDP 
 
 
 
where 
 
 
Fig. 14. Trend in the Emergence of Un-captured GDP Emerged by Uber in NYC  
(Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
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4.3 Spinoff to Sharing Economy 
   (1) New Functionality Development During Diffusion Process 
Uber’s conspicuous virtuous cycle between prices decline, and increased trips can largely 
be attributed to its self-propagating function incorporating new functionality development 
during its diffusion process as was prompted by the analysis in Fig. 7. 
Diffusion trajectory of innovative goods Y (trips of taxis and Uber in this case) can be 
depicted by the following epidemic function: 
 
 
where N: carrying capacity (sealing the adoption of innovative goods) and a: coefficients 
governing diffusion velocity. 
This equation leads to the following simple logistic growth (SLG) function:  
 
 
where b: coefficient indicating initial state of the diffusion. 
While the level of carrying capacity is assumed constant through the diffusion process in 
this function, in particular innovations, the correlation of the interaction between innovation 
and institutions displays a systematic change in the process of growth and maturity. This 
leads to the creation of a new carrying capacity in the process of its diffusion similar to 
equation (1) as follows: 
 
 
This equation leads to the following logistic growth within a dynamic carrying capacity 
(LGDCC) function, which demonstrates the level of carrying capacity enhancement as the 
diffusion proceeds (Meyer et al., 1999 [21]): 
 
 
where Nk: ultimate carrying capacity, and ak and bk: coefficients similar to a and b. 
Equation (4) demonstrates that the 3rd term of the denomination governs the dynamic 
carrying capacity and without this term results in SLG with a constant carrying capacity. 
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(2) Uber’s Self-propagating Function 
From equation (3), dynamic carrying capacity can be expressed as follows: 
      







⋅−
= )(/1
1)()( )(1 tYtYtN dttdYa
 
This demonstrates that N(t) increases together with the increase of Y(t), and its growth 
rate as time goes by. This implies that the LGDCC function demonstrates functionality 
development in the context of the self-propagating behavior (Watanabe et al. (2004) [30], 
Watanabe et al. (2009) [32]). 
Table 6 compares this self-propagating function in taxi and Uber in NYC by examining 
their adaptability to LGDCC. 
Table 6 Adaptability of Taxi and Uber’s Development Trajectories to LGDCC (NYC) 
  Nk a b ak bk adj. R2 
 
Taxi 
 
 
(Jan. 2004 – Jun.2013) 
 
2247.12 
(6.42) 
0.017 
(12.61) 
6.364 
(6.63) 
0.439 
(0.00x) 
10.30 
(0.00x) 0.976 
Uber 
 
(Jun.2013 – Sep.2015) 119.27 
(41.41) 
0.121 
(36.67) 
49.650 
(11.13) 
0.016 
(2.42*3) 
0.200 
(1.43*5) 0.999 
Taxi: based on medallion prices (Fig. 8), Uber: based on trips (Fig. 4) with spline interpolation (see Appendix 
4). 
LGDCC: Logistic growth with dynamic carrying capacity,   
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level except *3: 5 %, *5: 15 %, x: non-
significant. 
Table 6 demonstrates that while taxis depend on SLG as its 3rd term of the denomination 
(ak and bk) demonstrates statistically insignificant, Uber demonstrates depending  on LGDCC 
with statistically significant 3rd term of the denomination. 
 This demonstrate that Uber has developed with the self-propagating function. 
(3) Spinoff from Taxi to Uber 
This self-propagating function plays a vital role of the engine in spinning-off from 
traditional co-evolutional three mega-trends to new co-evolution as illustrated in Fig. 15. This 
spin-off plays significant role in inducing ICT-driven innovation (Watanabe et al. (2015, 
2016) [35, 36]). Here spin-off is defined as jumping to more sophisticated co-evolutional 
dynamism from traditional co-evolutional dynamism in inducing innovation (Watanabe et al., 
2011 [33]). 
From equation (5) functionality development in the LGDCC function can be depicted as 
follows: 
(5) 
ta
aa
bat
k
k
k
k ebe
NY
−
−
− ++
=
/11 (eq. (4)). 
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Functionality development = )(/1
1
)(
)(
)(1 tYtY
tNFD
dt
tdY
a
⋅−
==   (6) 
This equation demonstrates that  functionality development can be accelerated as its 
growth rate increases.   Since functionality development plays a locomotive role in leveraging 
spin-off (Watanabe et al. (2011) [33]), equation (6) indicates self-propagating function 
leverages spin-off by inducing functionality development. 
 
          
 
Fig. 15. Scheme of Spin-off Dynamism. 
This spin-off can be observed in industries not only transportation (Fig. 16) but also 
music industry, game industry and printing and publishing industry. Nowadays, even 
education industry has been behaving the similar trend. 
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Fig. 16. Co-evolution of 3 Mega-trends in Transportation Industry. 
 
  
 
Digitalization of taxi industry 
In Jan. 2016 the Uber has expanded 
to 375 cities worldwide.  
Ride on demand service 
E-hailing and payment service  
via mobile phone App 
Uber is cheaper than 
other taxies in US. 
Paradigm  
change 
People’s  
preferences 
shift  
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4.4 Dynamism of Uber’s ICT Driven Disruptive Business Model 
By the preceding analyses, the dynamism of Uber’s ICT driven disruptive business model 
can be identified as illustrated in Fig. 17. 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. The dynamism of Uber’s ICT Driven Disruptive Business Model. 
 
Co-existing development trajectory with taxi corresponds to two-faced nature of ICT that 
is behind the emergence of un-captured GDP. 
This emergence can be attributed to a strong substitution from taxi to Uber accelerated by 
contrasting vicious cycle between price increase and trips decrease in taxi and a virtuous 
cycle between price decline and trips increase in Uber. 
Uber’s virtuous cycle can be attributed to ICT’s self-propagating function that enhances 
the level of functionality as its diffusion proceeds. 
This self-propagating function plays a vital role in spin-offs from traditional co-evolution 
to new co-evolution between ICT advancement, paradigm change to increasing un-captured 
GDP dependence, and people’s preferences shift to supra-functionality beyond economic 
value. 
This spin-off accelerates further lower cost and higher services, which accelerates the 
foregoing virtuous cycle. 
Uber’s success can be attributed to constructing such ICT driven disruptive business 
model. 
Business models have been moving from pipes to platforms and we are in the midst of 
transformative shift in business design. Platforms allow participants to co-create and 
exchange value with each other. External developers can extend platform functionality and 
contribute back to the infrastructure of the business. Pltform users who act as producers can 
create value on the platform for other users to consume. All have been demonstrated by Uber. 
Uber’s disructive business model can be thus appreciated as a leader of transformative 
shift in business design by constructing the foregoing platform ecosystem. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Secret of the Uber’s System Success 
 
In light of the disruptive digital-technology-driven business model that Uber has used to 
trigger a ride-sharing revolution, the institutional sources of the company’s platform 
ecosystem architecture were analyzed.  
 
Aiming at elucidating institutional enablers creating Uber’s platform ecosystem, an 
empirical analysis of its co-existing development trajectory with taxi was attempted. 
 
Noteworthy findings include: 
(i) This co-existing development trajectory corresponds to two-faced nature of ICT that 
is behind the emergence of un-captured GDP,  
(ii) This emergence can be attributed to a strong substitution from taxi to Uber accelerated 
by contrasting vicious cycle between price increase and trips decrease in taxi and a 
virtuous cycle between price decline and trips increase in Uber, 
(iii) Uber’s virtuous cycle can be attributed to ICT’s self-propagating function that 
enhances the level of functionality as its diffusion proceeds, 
(iv) This self-propagating function plays a vital role in spin-offs from traditional co-
evolution to new co-evolution between ICT advancement, paradigm change to 
increasing un-captured GDP dependence, and people’s preferences shift to supra-
functionality beyond economic value, 
(v) This spin-off accelerates further lower cost and higher services, which accelerates the 
foregoing virtuous cycle, and 
(vi) Uber’s success can be attributed to constructing such ICT driven disruptive business 
model. 
5.2 Noteworthy Elements Essential to Well-Functioning Platform Ecosystem 
Architecture 
These findings form the base for the following suggestions supportive to constructing a 
well-functioning platform ecosystems: 
(i) Penetrate the current demand and challenge to meet it (e.g., sharing economy, 
saturation of taxi business, popularity of smartphone), 
(ii) Fully utilize the advancement of ICT, particularly of the Internet (e.g., smartphone, 
digital payment, big data analysis), 
(iii) Construct a co-evolution between sophisticated platform ecosystems and 
consolidation of broad stakeholders (e.g., mutual rating system among company, its 
drivers, and their passengers), 
(iv) Take care of the platform orchestration for efficiency, development and innovation 
(e.g., successive innovation for novel services as competitor like Lyft boosting and 
also as against movement emerging),  
(v) Thereby, creating a novel business model which has never been conceived before. 
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5.3 Implications of Un-captured GDP 
 
The emergence of un-captured GDP emerged by Uber can be attributed to: 
(i) People’s preferences shift to sharing economy and advancement of ICT, particularly 
of the Internet and subsequent smartphones, 
(ii) Better services, with cost and time saving for passengers, high efficient operation 
without additional investment and licenses fees for drivers, and optimal price-setting 
and market making beyond marginal cost for company through a massive database on 
driver and passenger behavior, and 
(iii) The paradigm shift from resources to the ecosystem that corresponds to the shift from 
captured GDP to un-captured GDP. 
Thus, Uber’s un-captured GDP can be considered as a consequence of the co-evolution 
between people’s preferences shift, advancement of ICT and this paradigm shift.  
This co-evolution has been leveraged Uber to create new business, to create services 
through interactions between stakeholders: company, drivers, and passengers. 
All this can be attributed to systems success: platform ecosystem architecture under the 
contemporary digital economy. 
5.4 Criticism to be Solved 
 
However, as a consequence of the transition to this new dynamism, there remain the 
following areas of criticism: 
 
(i) Business philosophy for discrimination (e.g., equivalence of services for remote areas 
with low population density), 
(ii) Safety issues, 
(iii) Treatment of privacy issues, and 
(iv) Compliance with labor standards. 
 
      Given the noted contrast between co-evolutionary success with institutional systems in 
host countries/cities and legal battles with quite a few countries/cities through Uber’s global 
expansion, thesources of this contention as a a consequence of business strategy, platform 
ecosystems design, and institutional systems in host country/city should be further studied. 
5.5 Future Works 
This analysis has explored a prototype of the analysis of the ICT-driven disruptive 
business model using the analysis of the co-evolution of three mega-trends that nurtures un-
captured GDP. 
Furthermore, analyses applying this approach is expected to be undertaken for similar 
disruptive business models in the (i) music industry, (ii) electronic gaming industry, (iii) 
printing and publishing industry, and (iv) education. In addition, business areas as fintech, 
legal and real estate should also be explored. 
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Appendix 1. Data Construction  
As a consequence of the numerical analysis of newly emerged innovation, elucidation of 
Uber’s systems success was a challenge in exploring the dark continent without published 
statistical data. Therefore, the challenge started from constructing series of reliable statistical 
data which can be summarized as follows. A sensitive analysis of the estimated data was 
conducted to ensure the reliability of constructed data, (Appendix 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A1. Estimate of Supplemental Period (2013/6 – 2015/9). 
 
 
 
 
Data were constructed by cross evaluating earlier work listed on the right-hand side and 
data/information by TLC and Uber. Supplemental estimate of the missing periods of the 
above estimates was based primarily on the spline functions illustrated above. 
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Commission 
 
 
Certify (2015), TLC, Uber 
 
 
 
Hickman (2015), TLC 
 
 
 
Hickman (2015), TLC 
 
 
UT = UD/(1-UD) x TT 
 
 
 
TR/TT 
 
 
 
Lunden (2014), Uber. 
*4   : 
 
*5   : 
 
*6   :                       
 
*7   :   
TT TUD
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Appendix 2. Two-faced Nature of ICT and Un-captured GDP 
  A2.1 Two-faced Nature of ICT and Subsequent Un-captured GDP 
 
   
  
 
The trend in medallion prices as a consequence of co-existing diffusion trajectory of a 
taxi with prices increase and that of Uber with prices decrease suggests that this trajectory is 
subject to the two-faced nature of ICT that is behind the emergence of un-captured GDP. 
Source: NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission.  
Fig. A2. Trend in Corporate Medallion Prices in NYC  
        and Contributors (2004-2015). 
Fig. A3. Two-faced Nature of ICT. 
Fig. A4. Anticipating Un-captured GDP.  
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A2.2 ICT Prices Trajectory and Two-faced Nature 
   (1) Modified Bi-logistic Growth  
 ICT prices can be depicted by the following modified bi-logistic growth as illustrated in Fig. 
A5: 
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i
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j
I ij eb
N
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+
+
+
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− 11
 
where I: ICT stock, J: dependency on the Internet, N: carrying capacity, jiji bbandaa ,, : diffusion velocity of I and J.
 5
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Fig. A5. Modified Bi-logistic Growth due to Two-faced Nature of ICT. 
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5
 Since the Internet has been playing a leading role in the whole ICT and providing significant
impacts on the diffusion trajectory of ICT, carrying capacity of logistic growth in      I and reverse
logistic growth in J as well as their diffusion tempo ( JaandIa ji    ) were treated as behaved in the similar 
way (a i I=a jJ). 
 
 
(A1) 
(A2) 
 
 
(A3) 
Uber                      Taxi 
PI 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
33 
 
In case of a co-existing diffusion of taxis and Uber, J and I correspond to UT (Uber trips) 
and TT (taxi trips) and Eq. (A2) can be represented as Table A1. 
 
Table A1 Co-existing Trajectory of Taxis and Uber in NYC (Jun. 2313 – Sep. 2015) 
35.1970.0.178.0103.0005.0355.1 2 DWRadjDTU
MPN
N
TT ++−−=
−
 
Where N (carrying capacity) = 2247, (Table 5) MP: medallion prices, D: 2014. May, Aug., Sep. = 1. 
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level. 
 
This demonstrates that coexistence of taxi and Uber is subject to two-faced nature of ICT. 
(2) Diffusion Coefficient 
Coefficients governing modified bi-logistic growth in Eq. (A1) can be identified as 
follows (here J and I correspond to UT and TT):  
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Thus, co-existing trajectory of taxis and Uber as demonstrated in Table A1 can be 
demonstrated as follows: 
TT TUI ee
P 33.020.0 31.01
2247
03.01
2247
−+
+
+
=
 
* Demonstrate the state in Sep. 2015 when η = 0.08. 
This modified bi-logistic growth demonstrates contributors to medallion prices level 
illustrated in Fig. A2. 
 
 
  
(A4) 
 
 
(A5) 
(A6)* 
(-3.12)       (-2.96)             (8.54)            (5.42) 
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(3) Trip Elasticity to Prices 
The marginal contribution of Uber and taxis dependency to medallion prices change can 
be depicted as follows: 
)1(
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Thus, the elasticity of Uber and taxi dependency to prices elasticity can be depicted as 
follows: 
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This demonstrates that contrary to taxis prices increase as their trips increase, Uber prices 
decrease as its trips increase leading a virtuous cycle for Uber. All this support the analysis of 
institutional sources being behind the emergence of un-captured GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (A8) 
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A2.3 Prospect of Un-captured GDP Nurtured by Uber 
As reviewed in Fig. 8, the magnitude of un-captured GDP can be measured by the balance 
between actual medallion prices and medallion prices without Uber. 
 
While the former can be estimated by Eq. A6, the latter can be estimated by Table A2. 
Table A2 demonstrates how the trend in medallion prices without Uber can be estimated both 
by logistic growth and parabolic growth.  The latter provides a higher estimate. 
 
Fig. A7 demonstrates prospect of un-captured GDP emerged by Uber estimated by the 
preceding approach.  
 
 
Fig. A6. Estimate of Uber’s Impact on Medallion Prices Decline  
               (Jan. 2004 - Sep. 2015).  
 
Table A2 Estimates of Medallion Prices (Jan. 2004 - Jun. 2013)  
 
Logistic growth  
 
Estimate t-value adj. R2 
N 2247.11 7.23 0.976 
a 0.02 14.21 
 
b 6.36 7.21 
 
 
Parabolic growth   
 
Estimate t-value adj. R2 
a 288.30 25.80 0.977 
b 5.31 11.91 
 
c 0.02 5.42 
 
 
Y: Medallion prices, N: Carrying capacity, t: Monthly trend, a, b, c: Coefficients 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. A7. Estimate of Un-captured 
GDP Anticipated by Uber 
(May. 2014 - May. 2032). 
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A2-4 Timing when Uber Overcame Chasm 
Chasm is a deep trench compelling new ventures start-up (Moore, 1991) [22]. 
It’s timing in the logistic growth diffusion trajectory can be depicted as follows 
(Watanabe et al., 2011) [33]: 
a
b
t
)32ln( −
=                                                                                                               (A9) 
where logistic growth diffusion trajectory is: 
atbe
NY
−+
=
1
 
In case of the following logistic growth within a dynamic carrying capacity (LGDCC) 
diffusion trajectory, a and b in the above equation can be approximated as follows (Watanabe 
et al., 2009) [31]: 

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Provided that Uber has been developing in line with the LGDCC diffusion trajectory as 
demonstrated in Table 6 in NYC from its launching in May 2011 (t = 1), t in eq A10 can be 
 
t = 21.5 (March 2013). 
 
This demonstrates that Uber has overcome the Chasm at the timing just before its share 
reached 10% in June 2013. 
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Appendix 3. Correlation between Medallion Prices and Taxi/Uber Prices 
Fig. A8 illustrates the correlation between taxi/Uber aggregated prices (PA) and medallion 
prices (MP) over the period May 2014–September 2015. 
 
Similarly, Fig. A9 illustrates the correlation between taxi prices (PT) and medallion prices 
without Uber (MPe) over the period May 2014–September 2015. 
 
PT vs. MPe and PA vs. MP demonstrates significant parallel correlation as far as 2015 is 
concerned and supports the significance of un-captured GDP measurement depending on the 
balance between PT and PA during the above period. 
  
 
Table A3 Correlation between Taxi/Uber Prices and Medallion Prices (2014.5 – 2015.9) 
)81.5()24.5()81.4()38.5(
73.1931.0.247.19ln227.1ln607.53441.3ln 2121
−
++−= DWRadjDPDPDMP AA
 
MP: Medallion prices, PA: Aggregated prices per trip and D1, D2: Dummy variables. 
D1: 2014.5 – 2014.11 = 1, rest = 0, D2: 2014.12 – 2015.9 = 1, rest = 0.  
 
)84.3()90.3()84.2()80.3()88.4(
26.1945.0.813.10ln144.1ln731.2ln127.1018.4ln 22321
−
++−+= DWRadjDPDPDPDMP TTTe
 
MPe: Estimated Medallion prices, PT: Taxi prices per trip and D1, D2, D3: Dummy variables. 
D1: 2014.5– 2014.8 = 1, rest = 0, D2: 2014.9– 2015.1 = 1, rest = 0, D3: 2015.2– 2015.9 = 1, rest = 0. 
 
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level. 
  
 
Fig. A8. Correlation between Taxi/Uber Aggregated Prices   
               (PA) and Medallion Prices (MP) (2014.5– 2015.9). 
Fig. A9. Correlation between Taxi Prices (PT) and Medallion   
               Prices without Uber (MPe) (2014.5 – 2015.9). 
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Appendix 4. Sensitivity of Uber Trips Estimate 
  A4.1 Estimate without and with Spline Interpolation 
In analyzing Uber diffusion trajectory (4.3 (1) and (2)), given the sensitive impacts of 
fluctuation on the trajectory formation within the limited samples, a comparative analysis was 
attempted by comparing Uber trips estimate with and without spline interpolation as shown in 
Fig. A10 and Table A4. The function used for the spline interpolation was based on the 
logistic growth function (Appendix 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. A10. Comparison of Uber Trips Estimate (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
UT: Uber trips estimated by taxis trips and Uber dependency (Appendix 1) 
UT2:  Uber trips estimate with spline interpolation 
Table A4 Comparison of Uber Trips Estimate  
                    (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
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A4.2 Effects of the Estimates of Uber-Driven Un-captured GDP    
(1) Un-captured GDP Emerged by Uber 
Sensitivity analysis of the effects of the estimated data was conducted by comparing the 
effects of un-captured GDP measurement as demonstrated in Fig. A11. The result 
demonstrates no substantial differences between estimates with and without spline 
interpolation. 
Fig. A11. Trends in Taxi Prices and Aggregated Prices in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
Aggregated prices PA are measured by the following equation:  
 
(2) Increase in the Emergence of Un-captured GDP Emerged by Uber 
Similarly, no substantial differences in an increase in the emergence of un-captured GDP 
between estimated data with and without spline interpolation were confirmed as demonstrated in 
Fig. A12. 
Fig. A12. The trend in Un-captured GDP Emerged by Uber in NYC (Jun. 2013 – Sep. 2015). 
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A4.3 Effects of Uber’s Development Trajectory Estimate 
While Uber’s development trajectory, estimated using trips trend, without spline  
interpolationdemonstrates the slight possibility of self-propagation by the LGDCC. Spline 
interpolation demonstrates explicit self-propagation by demonstrating the significance of the 
LGDCC. 
While this difference does not have any significant effects on aggregated prices and un-
captured GDP estimates, the effects on self-propagation can be attributed to a slightly higher 
pace (1-9%) of trips estimate after March 2015. This suggests that an optimal and not too 
rapid development pace seems essential for incorporating the self-propagating function. 
Table A5 Estimates of Taxi and Uber’s Development Trajectories in NYC by LGDCC 
 
 Nk a b ak bk adj. R2 
Taxi 
(2004/1-2013/6)  
2247.12 
(6.42) 
0.017 
(12.61) 
6.364 
(6.63) 
0.439 
(0.00x) 
10.30 
(0.00x) 0.976 
Uber 
(2013/6-2015/9) 
UT 144.13 (2.95) 
0.123 
(12.68) 
25.800 
(3.29) 
0.0001 
(0.10x) 
3.04 
(1.29*6) 0.992 
UT2 
119.27 
(41.41) 
0.121 
(36.67) 
49.650 
(11.13) 
0.016 
(2.42*3) 
0.200 
(1.43*5) 0.999 
Taxi: based on medallion prices (Fig. 8), Uber: based on trips (Fig. 4) without spline interpolation (UT) and 
with spline interpolation (UT2) (See Table A4).  
LGDCC: Logistic growth with dynamic carrying capacity,   
Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level except *3: 5 %, *5: 15 %, *6: 20 %, x: 
non-significant. 
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Appendix 5. Uber’s Expansion in 375 Cities Worldwide  
 (America as of January 2016) 
North America  North America  North America  North America  Central and South America  
Abilene  Fayetteville, NC  Miami  San Luis Obispo  Barranquilla  
Akron  Flagstaff  Midland-Odessa  Santa Barbara  Belo Horizonte  
Albuquerque  Flint  Milwaukee  Santa Fe  Bogotá  
Amarillo  Florida Keys  Minneapolis - St. Paul  Sarasota  Brasilia  
Ames  Fort Myers-Naples  Mobile, AL  Savannah-Hilton Head  Bucaramanga  
Ann Arbor  Fort Wayne  Modesto  Seattle  Cali - Colombia  
Asheville, NC  Fresno  Monterrey  South Bend  Campinas  
Athens  Gainesville  Montreal  Spokane  Cartagena  
Atlanta  Georgia Coast  Myrtle Beach  Springfield, IL  Cucuta  
Augusta  Grand Rapids  NW Indiana  St Louis  Goiania  
Austin  Greater Maine  Nashville  State College  Ibagué  
Bakersfield  Greater Maryland  New Hampshire  Stillwater  Lima  
Baltimore  Green Bay  New Jersey  Tacoma  Medellín  
Baton Rouge  Greenville, SC  New Jersey (Shore)  Tallahassee  Montevideo  
Beaumont  Guadalajara  New Orleans  Tampa Bay  Panama, Panama  
Bellingham  Hamilton  New York City  Taos  Porto Alegre  
Birmingham, AL  Hampton Roads  Niagara Region  Tijuana  Rio De Janeiro  
Boise  Harrisburg  Ocala, FL  Toledo  San Jose, Costa Rica  
Boston  Honolulu  Oklahoma City  Toluca  Santiago  
Bowling Green, KY  Houston  Omaha  Topeka  Santo Domingo  
Burlington  Indianapolis  Orange County  Toronto  São Paulo  
Central Atlantic Coast, FL  Inland Empire  Orlando  Tucson  Villavicencio  
Champaign  Jackson  Ottawa  Tulsa     
Charleston, SC  Jacksonville  Outer Banks, NC  Tuscaloosa     
Charlotte  Kalamazoo  Oxford  Vancouver, WA     
Charlottesville-Harrisonburg  Kansas City  Palm Springs  Ventura     
Chattanooga  Killeen  Pensacola, FL  Waco     
Chicago  Kingston  Peoria & Bloomington-Normal  Washington D.C.     
Cincinnati  Kitchener-Waterloo  Philadelphia  Western MA     
Cleveland  Knoxville  Phoenix  Wichita     
Coeur D'Alene  Lafayette, LA  Piedmont Triad, NC  Wilkes-Barre Scranton     
College Station  Lancaster, PA  Pittsburgh  Wilmington, NC     
Columbia, MO  Lansing  Portland  Windsor     
Columbia, SC  Las Cruces  Portland, ME  Worcester     
Columbus  Las Vegas  Puebla  Yuma     
Connecticut  Lawrence  Quad Cities  the Hamptons     
Corpus Christi  Lehigh Valley  Quebec City        
Dallas-Fort Worth  Leon  Queretaro        
Dayton  Lexington  Raleigh-Durham        
Delaware  Lincoln  Reading, PA        
Denver  Little Rock  Reno        
Des Moines  London, Ont  Rhode Island        
Detroit  Los Angeles  Richmond        
Eastern Idaho  Louisville  Roanoke-Blacksburg        
Eastern North Carolina  Lubbock  Rockford        
Edmonton  Madison  Sacramento        
El Paso  Manhattan  Salt Lake City        
Erie  Maui  San Antonio        
Fargo  Memphis  San Diego        
Fayetteville, AR  Mexico City  San Francisco Bay Area        
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Appendix 5. Uber’s Expansion in 375 Cities Worldwide (2)  
 (Other countries than America as of January 2016) 
 
Europe  Europe  East Asia  South Asia  Australia and 
 New Zealand  
Amsterdam  Saint Petersburg  Beijing  Ahmedabad  Adelaide  
Athens, GR  Sheffield  Changsha  Ajmer  Auckland  
Basel  Sochi  Chengdu  Bangalore  Brisbane  
Belfast  Sofia  Chongqing  Bhubaneswar  Canberra  
Berlin  Stockholm  Dalian  Chandigarh  Geelong  
Birmingham, UK  Strasbourg  Foshan  Chennai  Gold Coast  
Bordeaux  Tallinn  Guangzhou  Coimbatore  Melbourne  
Bratislava  Toulouse  Guiyang  Colombo  Mornington Peninsula  
Bristol  Trojmiasto  Hangzhou  Guwahati  Perth  
Brussels  Vienna  Hong Kong  Hyderabad  Sunshine Coast  
Bucharest  Vilnius  Incheon  Indore  Sydney  
Budapest  Warsaw  Jinan  Jaipur  Wellington  
Copenhagen  Wroclaw  Macau  Jodhpur     
Dublin  Zagreb  Nanjing  Kochi     
Edinburgh  Zurich  Ningbo  Kolkata     
Ekaterinburg     Qingdao  Mangalore     
Florence  Middle East  Seoul  Mumbai     
Geneva  Abu Dhabi  Shanghai  Mysore     
Genoa  Amman  Shenzhen  Nagpur     
Glasgow  Baku  Suzhou  Nashik     
Gothenburg  Beirut  Taichung  New Delhi     
Helsinki  Doha  Taipei  Pune     
Istanbul  Dubai  Tianjin  Surat     
Kazan  Eastern Province, KSA  Tokyo  Thiruvananthapuram     
Krakow  Jeddah  Wuhan  Udaipur     
Lausanne  Manama  Xi'An  Vadodara     
Leeds  Riyadh  Xiamen  Visakhapatnam     
Lille  Tel Aviv  Yantai        
Lisbon              
London  Africa  South East Asia        
Lyon  Alexandria  Bali        
Manchester  Cairo  Bandung        
Marseille  Cape Town  Bangkok        
Merseyside  Casablanca  Cebu        
Milan  Durban  Hanoi        
Minsk  Johannesburg  Ho Chi Minh City        
Moscow  Lagos  Ipoh        
Munich  Nairobi  Jakarta        
Nantes  Port Elizabeth  Johor Bahru        
Newcastle     Kuala Lumpur        
Nice     Manila        
Novosibirsk     Penang        
Oslo     Singapore        
Paris     Surabaya        
Porto              
Portsmouth              
Poznan              
Prague              
Rome              
Rostov-On-Don              
 
Source: Uber.com 
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